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Abstract - For many years, the commercial nuclear business has remained relatively stable in many 
ways. The introduction of new plants, the spread to new countries, and the development of key elements of 
the fuel cycle such as enrichment, reprocessing and waste disposal have been quite modest. That is unlikely 
to be the case in the coming years. A number of events and trends are becoming increasingly apparent and 
are cause for both opportunity and caution:
· New nuclear power plant orders are likely to grow and spread, particularly in the developing 
world, e.g. China and India.
· The growing recognition that the developing world will be a major competitor for limited energy 
resources is raising awareness in the developed world regarding concerns for future energy 
security.
· Clearer evidence of the effects of greenhouse gas emissions on global warming, largely from the 
burning of fossil fuels, is creating more attention on the environmental benefits of nuclear power.
· The last decade has shown unequivocal evidence of countries lying, cheating on their NPT 
obligation, and covertly carrying out nuclear weapons-related activities. Some have suggested 
their presumed need for a domestic nuclear fuel cycle as a rationale to pursue enrichment and/or 
reprocessing capabilities, which would move them to the doorstep of being nuclear weapons 
capable. The DPRK even took the action to abrogate the NPT to hold on to its nuclear weapons 
program.
· 9/11 and other evidence have made it undeniable that terrorist groups would like to obtain 
weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and would use them if they could.
A number of initiatives have been proposed recently1 to allow for the growth and spread of nuclear power 
while limiting the justifications for additional countries to pursue the acquisition of enrichment or 
reprocessing capabilities. Most of these initiatives have fresh fuel assurance as a central component. The 
rationale is simple; if a country can have assurance that it will receive all the fresh fuel it needs for the 
lifetime of its nuclear power plants, there should be no reason for it to pursue the difficult and costly 
capability to enrich the fuel itself or to reprocess its spent fuel to recover the produced plutonium for 
recycle as a fuel in its reactors.
However, such offers are unlikely to be fully persuasive if they are not connected to complementary offers 
for management of the spent nuclear fuel that is created during power production. In this paper, we discuss 
the complexity of the linkage to spent fuel take-back and the challenges and opportunities this present to 
nations’ repository programs.
  
1 M. Elbaradei, The Economists, 16 October 2003.
The US President Bush’s Speech to the National Defense University, 11 February 2004.
INFCIRC/640 – Multi-National Approaches (MNA) to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 22 February 2005.
J. S. Choi and T. H. Isaacs, “Toward a New Nuclear Regime,” Proceedings of ICAPP 2003, May 2003
V. Reis, et. al., “Nuclear fuel leasing, recycling and proliferation: Model a global view,” Nuclear   
Technology, 150, No. 2, p 121-131, May 2005.
E. Moniz, et. al., “Making the world safe for nuclear energy,” Oct 2004.
Introduction
For many years, the commercial nuclear business has remained relatively stable in many 
ways. That is unlikely to be the case in the coming years. 
While some countries have called for the phase out of nuclear power and others have 
ordered a small number of new plants, the overall profile of the nuclear power business 
has changed little. The number of countries with nuclear power plants is not much 
different than 10 years ago and the total number of operating plants has increased only 
slightly. Commercial enrichment and reprocessing services have remained the province 
of a few countries and consortia. Repository programs have moved forward slowly in 
some cases, backward in others, with a very small number making substantial progress.
We are now witnessing the beginnings of serious change, with significant consequences 
for the future nuclear regime. Business as usual will not be the business of the future. The 
way the nuclear and policy community respond will have much to do with energy 
adequacy, national security, international stability, and environmental consequences 
including waste management and disposal.
A number of events and trends are becoming increasingly apparent and are cause for both 
opportunity and caution:
· New nuclear power plant orders are likely to grow and spread, particularly in the 
developing world, e.g. China and India.
· The growing recognition that the developing world will be a major competitor for 
limited energy resources is raising awareness in the developed world regarding 
concerns for future energy security.
· Clearer evidence of the effects of greenhouse gas emissions on global warming, 
largely from the burning of fossil fuels, is creating more attention on the 
environmental benefits of nuclear power.
· The last decade has shown unequivocal evidence of countries lying, cheating on 
their NPT obligation, and covertly carrying out nuclear weapons-related activities. 
Some have suggested their presumed need for a domestic nuclear fuel cycle as a 
rationale to pursue enrichment and/or reprocessing capabilities, which would 
move them to the doorstep of being nuclear weapons capable. The DPRK even 
took the action to abrogate the NPT to hold on to its nuclear weapons program.
· 9/11 and other evidence have made it undeniable that terrorist groups would like 
to obtain weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and would 
use them if they could.
A number of initiatives have been proposed recently1,2,3,4,5,6 to allow for the growth and 
spread of nuclear power while limiting the justifications for additional countries to pursue 
the acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. Enrichment or reprocessing are 
the only ways for countries to gain the indigenous capability to transform natural 
materials and fuel for and from  nuclear power plants to directly weapons-usable 
materials.
Most of these initiatives have fresh fuel assurance as a central component. The rationale 
is simple; if a country can have assurance that it will receive all the fresh fuel it needs for 
the lifetime of its nuclear power plants, there should be no reason for it to pursue the 
difficult and costly capability to enrich the fuel itself or to reprocess its spent fuel to 
recover the produced plutonium for recycle as a fuel in its reactors.
While such guarantees face institutional, political, and economic hurdles, they could be 
overcome. For example, U.S. Secretary of Energy Bodman recently offered 17 tons of 
high enriched uranium to be blended into fuel grade low enriched uranium as a good faith 
gesture to create a “fuel reserve” that would be available in the event of supply 
disruption7.
However, such offers are unlikely to be fully persuasive if they are not connected to 
complementary offers for management of the spent nuclear fuel that is created during 
power production. Most countries have had issues associated with spent fuel storage and 
almost all have faced substantial problems in making progress on ultimate waste disposal, 
with or without reprocessing. Table 1 lists the waste management programs in 16 major 
nuclear power countries. These countries combined have more than 85% of the total 
global civilian nuclear reactors, and operate more than 93% of the total global civilian 
nuclear capacities. About half of the 16 countries listed in Table 1 have spent fuel 
reprocessing as their back-end fuel cycle policies. 
The process of selecting appropriate deep geological repositories among several of these 
countries is now under way. Finland and Sweden are well advanced with plans and site 
selection for direct disposal of spent fuel, since their Parliament decided to proceed on 
the basis that it was safe, using existing technology. The US has opted for a final 
repository in Yucca Mountain, Nevada. However, the process of license application has 
been delayed due to legislative, legal, and perhaps, technical challenges. The recent 
USDOE initiative on Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)8 includes the research 
and development on advanced separation process, and could revive the country’s interest 
on spent fuel reprocessing.
Spent Fuel Take-Back
Currently, about half the countries producing nuclear power (14 of 30) have five or fewer 
plants and operate less than 7% of global civilian nuclear capacities. These countries may 
have limited resources to develop their own spent fuel storage and repository disposal 
systems, and hence, making their pursuit of national programs for long-term waste
storage and permanent disposal politically and economically problematic. A regional or 
multi-national approach to long-term spent fuel management and waste disposal could be
an attractive option.
Table 1   Waste Management Programs in Major Nuclear Power Countries
Country #of Reactor (Capacity, GWe) Policy Facilities and progress towards final repositories
Belgium 7 (5.8) Reprocessing Central waste storage & underground laboratory established Construction of repository to begin about 2035 
Canada 18 (12.6) Direct Disposal Underground repository laboratory establishedRepository planned for use after 2025
China 9 (6.6) Reprocessing Central spent fuel storage in LanZhouSite selection studies underway for deep repository in BeiShan
Finland 4 (2.7) Direct Disposal
Spent fuel storages in operation
Low & intermediate-level repositories in operation since 1992
Site near Olkiluoto selected for deep repository for spent fuel
France 59 (63.3) Reprocessing
Two facilities for storage of short-lived wastes




but moving to 
direct disposal
Low-level waste sites in use since 1975
Intermediate-level wastes stored at Ahaus
Spent fuel storage at Ahaus and Gorleben
High-level repository to be operational after 2010 
India 15 (3.0) Reprocessing Research on deep geological disposal for HLW 
Japan 56 (47.8) Reprocessing
Low-level waste repository in operation
High-level waste storage facility at Rokkasho-mura since 1995
Investigations for deep geological repository site begun
Russia 31 (21.7) Reprocessing
Sites for final disposal under investigation
Central repository for low and intemediate-level wastes (ILW) 
planned for 2008
South Korea 20 (16.8) Direct Disposal
Central interim HLW store planned for 2016
Central low- & ILW repository planned for 2008
Investigating deep HLW repository sites 
Spain 9 (7.6) Direct Disposal Low & intermediate-level waste repository in operationFinal HLW repository site selection program planned for 2020. 
Sweden 10 (8.9) Direct Disposal
Central spent fuel storage facility in operation since 1985
Final repository for low to intermediate waste in operation since 1988
Underground research laboratory for HLW repository
Site selection for repository in two volunteered locations 
Switzerland 5 (3.2) Reprocessing
Central interim storage for high-level wastes at Zwilag since 2001
Central low and intermediate-level storages operating since 1993
Underground research laboratory for high-level waste repository, with 
deep repository to be completed by 2020. 
Ukraine 15 (13.1) Undecided Spent VVER-1000 fuel assemblies are sent to Russia for storage and perhaps, for reprocessing in some later date.
United 
Kingdom 23 (11.9) Reprocessing
Low-level waste repository in operation since 1959.
High-level waste is vitrified and stored at Sellafiled
Underground HLW repository planned. 
USA 104 (99.2) Direct Disposal
Three low-level waste sites in operation
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in operation for defense TRU wastes
2002 decision to proceed with geological repository at Yucca 
Mountain 
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However, for a country pursuing its own national repository program, there is a perceived 
fear that just the mention of the regional or multi-national repository could jeopardize its
own national repository program. 
Thus, to allay such fear, the idea of spent fuel take-back arises and is gaining visibility as 
part of a new nuclear regime4 that could address the front-end and back-end of the fuel 
cycle simultaneously. If it becomes possible to offer countries both fresh fuel assurances 
and guarantees of spent fuel take-back (or take-away, since it is not necessary that it be 
returned to the same country) it may be possible to provide the mechanism for countries 
that currently do not have nuclear power to take full advantage of the benefits without the 
complexity, cost, and political consequences associated with having full fuel cycle 
capability. 
This could tie in nicely with the countries that have small numbers of nuclear power 
plants who no doubt would rather have their spent fuel and nuclear waste disposed of 
elsewhere, either in shared regional facilities or in the repositories of countries with major 
nuclear power programs. The spent fuel take-back should not become a threat to those 
countries currently developing their own national repositories. For if they decide to 
taking care of their own spent fuel and wastes, there should not be pressure for them to 
take other countries’ spent fuel and wastes.
So then, who should take other countries’ spent fuel back? To begin, the Nuclear Weapons 
States (NWS) as a group should lead in promoting the “spent fuel take-back” and 
developing regional or multi-national repository program9.
The NWS group operates more than half of the world’s civilian nuclear reactors, and more 
than 55% of the world’s nuclear electricity generation capacity. It also holds more than half 
of the global spent fuel and radioactive waste inventories. They have to develop their own 
repositories and should be capable of providing spent-fuel storage and waste disposal 
services to other countries within their region. In addition, there is less of a proliferation 
concern for managing other’s spent fuel in the NWS. 
The former Soviet Union took spent fuel back from the Soviet-designed reactors located in 
Eastern Europe and Finland. Currently, the Russian Federation (RF) accepts spent VVER 
(440 or 1000) fuel from Commonwealth Independent States (CISs) for a fee and on a case-
by case basis. Also, the RF has changed its law to allow for import of other countries’ spent 
fuel for storage and processing. And most recently, Russian President Putin called for the 
creation of an international system of facilities that would provide enrichment and other 
nuclear fuel cycle related services to other countries that wants nuclear power. He said 
Russia could establish the enter of such facilities on its soil.10
The US initiated the research reactor spent fuel take-back program (FRRSNFA) and 
supported a similar Russian program (RRRFR) on grounds of non-proliferation. Although 
it is a different and a more complex issue for public-acceptance, the take-back of power 
reactor spent fuel from other countries to storage and processing facilities and repositories 
in or operated by the NWS is an attractive solution on grounds of global security and non-
proliferation. 
Not all the NWSs can accept other countries’ spent fuel. Notably, France and UK may 
have geographic constraints in repository siting. A viable solution would be the 
cooperation among the NWSs, e.g., HLW canisters from France and UK may be shipped 
and disposed of in a Russian repository. Such cooperation may also help in the 
disposition of separated fissionable materials, e.g., the disposition of UK’s plutonium in 
French reactors. Also, China may be interested in storing and disposing the spent fuel 
from Taiwan.
In addition to its large share of nuclear capacities and leadership role in nuclear power 
development, the NWS group is also the major supplier for nuclear fuel, equipment and 
services to other non nuclear weapons states (NNWS). It makes a lot of sense for these 
countries (France, Russia, UK, and the US) would take back the spent fuel while 
supplying fresh fuel to countries which agree to forgo dangerous and costly fuel cycle 
facilities.
If the NWS group could set an example in taking back spent fuel, major uranium-
producing countries such as Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan and others could also help in 
disposing spent fuel from other NNWSs.  The return of spent fuel to these countries for 
disposal could benefit their uranium-supply business, in addition to enhancing global 
security and non-proliferation.
Should such a regime be realized, this would have the important mutual benefit of 
allowing the growth and spread of nuclear power while simultaneously reducing the 
incentive or rationale for the spread of either enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. 
Thus the most sensitive elements in the nuclear fuel cycle that could be misused to 
support a weapons program would be limited. The spread of global spent fuel storage 
locations would also be minimized, and as a result, the availability of nuclear materials 
and the corresponding proliferation risks could be reduced. And countries that decide to 
pursue such capabilities without an obvious energy related reason would provide an early 
signal to the rest of the world.
Acceptance of Geologic Repository
Ironically, it is also possible that such a set of initiatives could assist in making national 
and regional spent fuel or high-level radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities and 
programs more acceptable (though by no means easy). If a network of such fuel cycle 
services is offered by those countries currently possessing them, it would add an 
important national security and international stability dimension to storage and disposal 
programs. 
Repositories, for example, would not be simply dumps for utility spent fuel and wastes; 
they would be critical elements in a network of fresh fuel assurances and spent fuel take-
back that will demonstrably minimize prospects of the misuse of the civilian fuel cycle to 
abet steps toward a new nuclear weapons program. And as with enrichment and 
reprocessing, the number and location of these sensitive facilities would be restricted to a 
small number, located in those countries with ample experience, capabilities, and the 
stability to secure them. These security benefits, if properly conducted and 
communicated, could assist in demonstrating their value to a skeptical public.
Remaining Issue
None of this, of course, should take the place of high priority on securing the existing 
facilities and materials of greatest concern today. Security of nuclear weapons and the 
materials that can be used to make them must remain our highest priority wherever they 
are located.  But as we look to the future, the opportunity and, in fact, responsibility 
exists to shape a new nuclear regime that can simultaneously help meet the energy, 
security, and waste management challenges better than addressing each aspect separately.
Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech in 1953, the subsequent creation of the IAEA 
and the NPT, and continuing export control agreements are among the pillars of the 
nexus between nuclear power and security. Countries gave up a piece of their 
sovereignty, for example, and allowed international inspection of their nuclear operations 
to demonstrate their peaceful intentions. Thus, from the earliest days of nuclear power, 
the opportunity and the risks were apparent and governmental instruments and 
international cooperation were seen as essential to augment commercial market 
mechanisms. 
Once again there is a need and an opportunity to augment the market. By investigating 
cooperative mechanisms, or networks, among leading nuclear nations to serve coming 
energy needs, the possibility exists to allow for the growth and spread of nuclear power 
while reducing security and waste management concerns below where they are today.
Conclusion
Global security concerns will arise with the anticipated growth and spread of nuclear 
power and its associated fuel cycle capabilities. The fissionable materials used in nuclear 
weapons come from either uranium enrichment or the reprocessing of SNF to extract 
plutonium. From the beginning of nuclear power the dual use nature of enrichment and 
reprocessing have been well understood; the same facilities needed to make and process 
nuclear power reactor fuel can be modified to make weapons usable materials.
Recent initiatives have been proposed by many, including president George Bush and
IAEA director general Mohammed ElBaradei, to limit the spread of these sensitive 
nuclear facilities. A global network to provide assurances of fresh fuel and take back SNF 
could dramatically reduce or eliminate the need for additional countries to develop their 
own enrichment or reprocessing capabilities while fully preserving their ability to pursue 
nuclear power. Russian president Putin recently called for the creation of an international 
system of facilities that would provide enrichment and other nuclear fuel cycle related 
services to other countries that wants nuclear power.
Of course, the promise of the return of SNF to the country of origin or to a third country 
does not eliminate and may heighten the issue of its ultimate disposition. Many features 
of such an arrangement will have to be carefully defined and developed before an 
effective international framework can be established. Nevertheless, this approach holds 
out the possibility of repositories being transformed from perceived waste dumps to 
integral elements of a security-based international network. The network could include 
regional or multinational facilities and would provide developing countries with the 
ability to meet growing energy demand while reducing proliferation and security 
concerns. Doing the right thing may some day lead to greater public understanding and 
acceptance of the important role of repositories in realizing a world with adequate energy, 
environmental integrity, and enhanced security.
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